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Abstract
Microsoft’s PowerShell is a command-line shell and
scripting language that is installed by default on Win-
dows machines. Based on Microsoft’s .NET frame-
work, it includes an interface that allows program-
mers to access operating system services. While Pow-
erShell can be configured by administrators for re-
stricting access and reducing vulnerabilities, these
restrictions can be bypassed. Moreover, PowerShell
commands can be easily generated dynamically, ex-
ecuted from memory, encoded and obfuscated, thus
making the logging and forensic analysis of code ex-
ecuted by PowerShell challenging.
For all these reasons, PowerShell is increasingly
used by cybercriminals as part of their attacks’ tool
chain, mainly for downloading malicious contents and
for lateral movement. Indeed, a recent comprehensive
technical report by Symantec dedicated to Power-
Shell’s abuse by cybercrimials [1] reported on a sharp
increase in the number of malicious PowerShell sam-
ples they received and in the number of penetration
tools and frameworks that use PowerShell. This high-
lights the urgent need of developing effective methods
for detecting malicious PowerShell commands.
In this work, we address this challenge by imple-
menting several novel detectors of malicious Power-
Shell commands and evaluating their performance.
We implemented both “traditional” natural lan-
guage processing (NLP) based detectors and detec-
tors based on character-level convolutional neural
networks (CNNs). Detectors’ performance was eval-
uated using a large real-world dataset.
Our evaluation results show that, although our
detectors (and especially the traditional NLP-based
ones) individually yield high performance, an ensem-
ble detector that combines an NLP-based classifier
with a CNN-based classifier provides the best perfor-
mance, since the latter classifier is able to detect ma-
licious commands that succeed in evading the former.
Our analysis of these evasive commands reveals that
some obfuscation patterns automatically detected by
the CNN classifier are intrinsically difficult to detect
using the NLP techniques we applied.
Our detectors provide high recall values while
maintaining a very low false positive rate, making
us cautiously optimistic that they can be of practical
value.
1 Introduction
Modern society is more than ever dependent on digi-
tal technology, with vital sectors such as health-care,
energy, transportation and banking relying on net-
works of digital computers to facilitate their oper-
ations. At the same time, stakes are high for cy-
bercriminals and hackers to penetrate computer net-
works for stealthily manipulating victims’ data, or
wreaking havoc in their files and requesting ransom
payments. Protecting the ever-growing attack sur-
face from determined and resourceful attackers re-
quires the development of effective, innovative and
disruptive defense techniques.
One of the trends in modern cyber warfare is
the reliance of attackers on general-purpose software
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tools that already preexist at the attacked machine.
Microsoft PowerShell1 is a command-line shell and
scripting language that, due to its flexibility, power-
ful constructs and ability to execute scripts directly
from the command-line, became a tool of choice for
many attackers. Several open-source frameworks,
such as PowerShell Empire2 and PowerSploit3 have
been developed with the purpose of facilitating post-
exploitation cyber-offence usage of PowerShell script-
ing.
While some work has been done on detecting ma-
licious scripts such as JavaScript [2, 3, 4, 5], Power-
Shell, despite its prominent status in the cyber war-
fare, is relatively untreated by the academic commu-
nity. Most of the work on PowerShell is done by se-
curity practitioners at companies such as Symantec
[1] and Palo Alto Networks[6]. These publications fo-
cus mainly on surveying the PowerShell threat, rather
than on developing and evaluating approaches for de-
tecting malicious PowerShell activities. The discrep-
ancy between the lack of research on automatic de-
tection of malicious PowerShell commands and the
high prevalence of PowerShell-based malicious cyber
activities highlights the urgent need of developing ef-
fective methods for detecting this type of attacks.
Recent scientific achievements in machine learning
in general, and deep learning [7] in particular, pro-
vide many opportunities for developing new state-
of-the-art methods for effective cyber defense. Since
PowerShell scripts contain textual data, it is natu-
ral to consider their analysis using various methods
developed within the Natural Language Processing
(NLP) community. Indeed, NLP techniques were
applied for the sentiment analysis problem [8], as
well as for the problem of detecting malicious non-
PowerShell scripts [5]. However, adapting NLP tech-
niques for detecting malicious scripts is not straight-
forward, since cyber attackers deliberately obfuscate
their script commands for evading detection [1].
In the context of NLP sentiment analysis, deep
learning methods considering text as a stream of
characters have gained recent popularity and have
been shown to outperform state of art methods
1https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/
2https://www.powershellempire.com/
3https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit
[9, 10]. To the best of our knowledge, our work is
the first to present an ML-based (and, more specifi-
cally, deep-learning based) detector of malicious Pow-
erShell commands. Motivated by recent successes of
character-level deep learning methods for NLP, we
too take this approach, which is compelling in view of
existing and future obfuscation attempts by attackers
that may foil extraction of high-level features.
We develop and evaluate several ML-based meth-
ods for the detection of malicious PowerShell com-
mands. These include detectors based on novel deep
learning architectures such as Convolutional Neural
Networks (CNNs) [11, 12] and Recurrent Neural Net-
works (RNNs) [13], as well as detectors based on more
traditional NLP approaches such as linear classifica-
tion on top of character n-grams and bag-of-words
[14].
Detecting malicious PowerShell commands within
the high volume of benign PowerShell commands
used by administrators and developers is challeng-
ing. We validate and evaluate our detectors using
a large dataset4 consisting of 60,098 legitimate Pow-
erShell commands executed by users in Microsoft’s
corporate network and of 5,819 malicious commands
executed on virtual machines deliberately infected by
various types of malware, as well as of 471 malicious
commands obtained by other means, contributed by
Microsoft security experts.
Contributions The contributions of our work are
two-fold. First, we address the important and
yet under-researched problem of detecting malicious
PowerShell commands. We present and evaluate the
performance of several novel ML-based detectors and
demonstrate their effectiveness on a large real-world
dataset.
Secondly, we demonstrate the effectiveness of
character-level deep learning techniques for the de-
tection of malicious scripting. Our evaluation results
establish that, although traditional NLP-based ap-
proaches yield high detection performance, ensem-
ble learning that combines traditional NLP models
with deep learning models further improves perfor-
mance by detecting malicious commands that suc-
4User sensitive data was anonymized.
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ceed in evading traditional NLP techniques.
Since the character-level deep learning approach is
intrinsically language independent, we expect it can
be easily adapted for detecting malicious usage of
other scripting languages.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In
Section 2, we provide background on PowerShell and
how it is used as an attack vector and on some con-
cepts required for understanding our deep-learning
based detectors. In Section 3, we describe our
dataset, how we pre-process commands and how our
training set is constructed. A description of our de-
tectors is provided in Section 4, followed by an evalu-
ation of their performance in Section 5. Key related
work is surveyed in Section 6. We conclude with a
summary of our results and a short discussion of av-
enues for future work in Section 7. 8
2 Background
2.1 PowerShell
Introduced by Microsoft in 2006, PowerShell is a
highly flexible system shell and scripting technology
used mainly for task automation and configuration
management [15]. Based on the .NET framework, it
includes two components: a command-line shell and
a scripting language. It provides full access to criti-
cal Windows system functions such as the Windows
Management Instrumentation (WMI) and the Com-
ponent Object Model (COM) objects. Also, as it is
compiled using .NET, it can access .NET assemblies
and DLLs, allowing it to invoke DLL/assembly func-
tions. These built-in functionalities give PowerShell
many strong capabilities such as downloading content
from remote locations, executing commands directly
from memory, and accessing local registry keys and
scheduled tasks. A detailed technical discussion of
these capabilities can be found in [16].
As typical of scripting languages, PowerShell com-
mands can be either executed directly via the com-
mand line, or as part of a script. PowerShell’s
functionality is greatly extended using thousands
of ‘cmdlets’ (command-lets), which are basically
modular and reusable scripts, each with its own
designated functionality. Many cmdlets are built
into the language (such as the Get-Process and
Invoke-Command cmdlets), but additional cmdlets
can be loaded from external modules to further enrich
the programmer’s capabilities. The Get-Process
cmdlet, for instance, when given a name of a machine
which can be accessed in the context in which Power-
Shell is executed, returns the list of processes that are
running on that machine. As another example, the
Invoke-Command cmdlet executes the command pro-
vided as its input either locally or on one or more
remote computers, depending on arguments. The
Invoke-Expression cmdlet provides similar func-
tionality but also supports evaluating and running
dynamically-generated commands.
2.1.1 PowerShell as an Attack Vector
While PowerShell can be configured and managed by
the company IT department to restrict access and re-
duce vulnerabilities, these restrictions can be easily
bypassed, as described by Symantec’s comprehensive
report about the increased use of PowerShell in at-
tacks [1]. Furthermore, logging the code executed by
PowerShell can be difficult. While logging the com-
mands provided to PowerShell can be done by mon-
itoring the shell that executes them, this does not
necessarily provide the visibility required for detect-
ing PowerShell-based attacks, since PowerShell com-
mands may use external modules and/or invoke com-
mands using dynamically-defined environment vari-
ables.
For instance, the Kovter trojan [17] uses sim-
ple, randomly generated innocent-looking environ-
ment variables in order to invoke a malicious script.
One such command that appears in our dataset is
“IEX $env:iu7Gt”, which invokes a malicious script
referenced by the “iu7Gt” environment variable.5 A
log of the executing shell would only show the com-
mand before its dynamic interpretation, but will not
provide any data regarding the malicious script.
Although Microsoft improved the logging capabil-
ities of PowerShell 5.0 in Windows 10 by introducing
the AntiMalware Scan Interface (AMSI) generic in-
5IEX is an alias of Invoke-Expression.
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terface [18], many methods of bypassing it have al-
ready been published [19, 1], thus effective forensic
analysis of malicious PowerShell scripts remains chal-
lenging.
In addition to the difficulty of forensic analysis,
malware authors have several other good reasons for
using PowerShell as part of their attacks [1]. First,
since PowerShell is installed by default on all Win-
dows machines, its strong functionality may be lever-
aged by cybercriminals, who often prefer using pre-
installed tools for quicker development and for stay-
ing under the radar. Moreover, PowerShell is almost
always whitelisted since it is benignly used by Win-
dows system administrators [16].
Secondly, as PowerShell is able to download re-
mote content and to execute commands directly from
memory, it is a perfect tool for conducting file-less
intrusions [20] in order to evade detection by con-
ventional anti-malware tools. Finally, as we describe
next, there are multiple easy ways in which Power-
Shell code can be obfuscated.
PowerShell Code Obfuscation As described in
[1], there are numerous ways of obfuscating Power-
Shell commands, many of which were implemented
by Daniel Bohannon in 2016 and are publicly avail-
able in the “Invoke-Obfuscation” module he created
[21]. Figure 1 lists a few key obfuscation methods
we encountered in our data and provides examples of
their usage. We now briefly explain each of them.
1. As PowerShell commands are not case-sensitive,
alternating lower and upper case letters often ap-
pear in malicious commands.
2. Command flags may often be shortened to their
prefixes. For instance, the “-noprofile” flag
that excludes a PowerShell command from the
execution policy can be shortened to “-nop”.
3. Commands may be executed using the
“-EncodeCommand” switch. While the de-
sign goal for this feature was to provide a way
of wrapping DOS-unfriendly commands, it is
often used by malicious code for obfuscation.
4. As mentioned previously, the
“Invoke-Command” cmdlet evaluates a Power-
Shell expression represented by a string and can
therefore be used for executing dynamically-
generated commands.
5. Characters can be represented by their ASCII
values using “[char]ASCII-VALUE” and then
concatenated to create a command or an
operand.
6. Commands may be base-64-encoded and
then converted back to a string using the
“FromBase64String” method.
7. Base64 strings can be encoded/decoded in vari-
ous ways (UTF8, ASCII, Unicode).
8. Yet another way of obfuscating commands is to
insert characters that are disregarded by Power-
Shell such as `.
9. Command strings may be manipulated in real-
time before evaluation using replacement and
concatenation functions.
10. The values of environment variables can be con-
catenated in run-time to generate a string whose
content will be executed.
11. Some malware generate environment variables
with random names in every command execu-
tion.
While the ability to encode/represent commands
in different ways and generate them dynamically at
run-time provides for greater programming flexibility,
Figure 1 illustrates that this flexibility can be easily
misused. As observed by [1], “These [obfuscation]
methods can be combined and applied recursively,
generating scripts that are deeply obfuscated on the
command line”.
2.2 Deep Learning
In this section we provide background on deep learn-
ing concepts and architectures that is required for un-
derstanding the deep-learning based malicious Pow-
erShell command detectors that we present in Section
4.
4
ID Description Example
1
Using alternating lower and upper case
letters
-ExecUTIONPoLICy BypASs -wiNDoWSTYLe hidDeN
(NEW-objecT
SYstEM.NET.wEbCLIeNt).DOWnLoADFiLE(<removed>);
2 Using short flags -nop -w hidden -e <removed>
3 Using encoded commands -EncodedCommand <removed>
4
Invoke expression using its string
representation
- Invoke-Expression (("New-Object
Net.WebClient")).(’Downloadfile’) ...
5 Using ”[char]” instead of a character ... $cs = [char]71; $fn = $env:temp+$cs; ...
6 Reading data in base 64
IEX $s=New-Object IO.MemoryStream([Convert]::
FromBase64String(’<removed>’));
7 Using UTF8 encoding
$f=[System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetString
([System.Convert]::FromBase64String(<removed>’));
...
8
Inserting characters overlooked by
PowerShell like `
...(new-object -ComObject
wscript.shell).Popup(E¨-mail:
<removed>@<removed>.com ‘n ‘nClient:
<removed>"`) ...
9 String manipulation
... $filename.Replace(’-’,’/’) ... $env:temp +
’:’ + $name + ’.exe ...
10 Concatenating variables inline
$emnuxgy=’i’; $jrywuzq=’x’; $unogv=’e’;...
Invoke-Expression ($emnuxgy+$unogv+$jrywuzq+’ ’
...);
11
Using a random name for a variable in every
run
iex $env:vruuyg
Figure 1: Examples of PowerShell obfuscation methods.
Artificial Neural Networks [22, 23] are a family of
machine learning models inspired by biological neural
networks, composed of a collection of inter-connected
artificial neurons, organized in layers. A typical ANN
is composed of a single input layer, a single output
layer, and one or more hidden layers. When the
network is used for classification, outputs typically
quantify class probabilities. A Deep Neural Network
(DNN) has multiple hidden layers. There are several
key DNN architectures and the following subsections
provide more details on those used by our detectors.
2.2.1 Convolutional Neural Networks
(CNNs)
A CNN is a learning architecture, traditionally used
in computer vision [24, 25]. We proceed by provid-
ing a high-level description of the major components
from which the CNN deep networks we use are com-
posed.
As its name implies, the main component of a CNN
is a convolutional layer. Assuming for simplicity that
our input is a 2D grey scale image, a convolutional
layer uses 2D k × k “filters” (a.k.a. “kernels”), for
some integer k. As the filter is sliding over the 2D in-
put matrix, the dot product between its k×k weights
and the corresponding k × k window in the input is
being computed. Intuitively, the filter slides over the
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input in order to search for the occurrences of some
feature or patterm. Formally, given a k× k filter, for
each k×k window x of the input to which the filter is
applied, we calculate wT ·x+b, where w is the filter’s
weights matrix and b is a bias vector representing the
constant term of the computed linear function. The
k2 weights of w, as well as the k values of b, are being
learnt during the training process.
Filters slide over the input in strides, whose size
is specified in pixels. Performing the aforementioned
computation for a single filter sliding over the en-
tire input using stride s results in an output of di-
mensions
(
(n − k)/s + 1) × ((n − k)/s + 1), called
the filter’s “activation map”. Using l filters and
stacking their activation maps results in the full out-
put of the convolutional layer, whose dimensions are(
(n− k)/s + 1)× ((n− k)/s + 1)× l.
In order to maintain the non-linear properties of
the network when using multiple convolutional layers,
a non-linear layer (a.k.a. activation layer) is added
between each pair of convolutional layers. The non-
linear layer applies a non-linear activation function
such as the Rectified Linear Units (ReLU) function
f(x) = max(0, x) whose properties were investigated
by [26] or the hyperbolic tangent f(x) = tanh(x)
function.
A max pooling layer [27] “down-samples” neurons
in order to generalize and reduce overfitting [28]. It
applies a k× k window across the input and outputs
the maximum value within the window, thus reducing
the number of parameters by a factor of k2. A fully
connected layer connects all inputs to all outputs.
Intuitively, each output neuron of the convolutional
layers represents an image feature. These features
are often connected to the network’s outputs via one
or more fully connected layers, where the weights be-
tween inputs and outputs (learnt during the training
process) determine the extent to which each feature
is indicative of each output class.
Dropout layers [29] can be used between fully con-
nected layers in order to probabilistically reduce over-
fitting. Given a probability parameter p, at each
training stage, each node in the input remains in the
network with probability p or is “dropped out” (and
is disconnected from outputs) with probability 1− p.
Dropout layers, as well as fully connected layers, may
also apear in recurrent neural networks, described
next.
2.2.2 Recurrent Neural Networks (RNNs)
RNNs are neural networks able to process sequences
of data representing, e.g., text [30, 31], speech [32, 33,
34], handwriting [35] or video [36] in a recurrent man-
ner, that is, by repeatedly using the input seen so far
in order to process new input. We use an RNN net-
work composed of long short-term memory (LSTM)
blocks [37]. Each such block consists of a cell that
stores hidden state, able to aggregate/summarize in-
puts received over an extended period of time. In
addition to the cell, an LSTM block contains 3 com-
ponents called gates that control and regulate infor-
mation flow into and out of the cell. Roughly speak-
ing, the input gate determines the extent to which
new input is used by the cell, the forget gate deter-
mines the extent to which the cell retains memory,
and the output gate controls the level to which the
cell’s value is used to compute the block’s output.
In the context of text analysis, a common practice
is to add an embedding layer before the LSTM layer
[38, 39]. Embedding layers serve two purposes. First,
they reduce the dimensionality of the input. Sec-
ondly, they represent input in a manner that retains
its context. The embedding layer converts each in-
put token (typically a word or a character, depending
on the problem at hand) to a vector representation.
For example, when taking a character-level approach,
one can expect that the representations of all digits
computed by the embedding layer will be vectors that
are close to each other. When the problem benefits
from a word-level representation, word2vec [40] em-
beddings represent each word as a vector such that
words that share common contexts in the text corpus
using which the model was trained are represented by
vectors that are close to each other.
A bidirectional RNN (BRNN) network [41] is an
RNN architecture in which two RNN layers are con-
nected to the output, one reading the input in order
and the other reading it in reverse order. Intuitively,
this allows the output to be computed based on in-
formation from both past and future states. BRNNs
have found successful applications in various fields
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[42, 43, 44]. For instance, in the context of the sen-
timent analysis problem, when processing text from
the middle of a sentence, text seen in the beginning
of the sentence, as well as text seen at the end the
sentence, may be used by the computation.
3 The dataset
Our work is based on a large dataset which, after pre-
processing (which we shortly describe), consists of
66,388 distinct PowerShell commands, 6,290 labeled
as malicious and 60,098 labelled as clean. Malicious
dataset commands belong to two types. For training
and cross-validation, we use 5,819 distinct commands
obtained by executing known malicious programs in
a sandbox and recording all PowerShell commands
executed by the program. For testing, we used 471
malicious PowerShell commands seen in the course
of May 2017, contributed by Microsoft security ex-
perts. Using this latter type of malicious instances
for evaluating our detection results mimics a realis-
tic scenario, in which the detection model is trained
using data generated inside a sandbox and is then
applied to commands executed on regular machines.
As for clean commands, we received from Mi-
crosoft a collection of PowerShell commands executed
within Microsoft’s corporate network in the course
of May 2017, on machines which had no indication
of malware infection thirty days prior to the execu-
tion of the PowerShell command. Clean commands
were split 48,094 for training and cross-validation and
12,004 for testing.
3.1 Pre-processing & Training Set
Construction
We implemented a preprocessor whose key goals are
to perform PowerShell command decoding and nor-
malization for improved detection results. It also
eliminates identical (as well as “almost identical”)
commands in order to reduce the probability of data
leakage.
First, in order to be able to apply detection
on “cleartext”, our preprocessor decodes PowerShell
commands that are encoded using base-64. Such
commands are identified by the -EncodedCommand
flag (or any prefix of it starting with ’-e’ or ’-E’). All
these commands undergo base-64 decoding, as other-
wise they provide no useful detection data.6
Next, the preprocessor normalizes commands in or-
der to reduce the probability of a data leakage prob-
lem [45] that, in our setting, may result from using
almost-identical commands for training the model
and for validating it. Indeed, we observed in our
dataset PowerShell commands that differ only in a
very small number of characters. In most cases, this
was due to either the use of different IP addresses
or to the use of different numbers/types of whites-
pace characters (e.g., spaces, tabs and newlines) in
otherwise-identical commands. To avoid this prob-
lem, we replaced all numbers to asterisk signs (‘*’)
and all contiguous sequences of whitespace charac-
ters to a single space and then eliminated duplicates.
We also observed in our dataset PowerShell case-
equivalent commands that only differ in letter casing
(see entry 1 in Figure 1). This was dealt with by
ensuring that only a single command from each case-
equivalence class is used for training/validation. We
note that the dimensions of the dataset specified ear-
lier relate to the numbers of distinct commands after
this pre-processing stage.
Our dataset is very imbalanced, since the number
of clean commands is an order of magnitude larger
than that of malicious commands. In order to prevent
model bias towards the larger class, we constructed
the training set by duplicating each malicious com-
mand used for training 8 times so that the ratio of
clean/malicious training commands is 1:1. We pre-
ferred to handle imbalance this way rather than by
using under-sampling in order to avoid the risk of
over-fitting, which may result when a neural network
is trained using a small number of examples.
6Command arguments encoded in either base-64 or UTF8
(see entries 6, 7 in Table 1) are not decoded since, in these
cases, the encapsulating command is available and can be an-
alyzed by the detector.
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Figure 2: 4-CNN architecture used
4 Detection Models
In this section we describe the machine learning mod-
els we used for malicious PowerShell command de-
tection. We then evaluate and compare their perfor-
mance in Section 5.
We implemented several deep-learning based de-
tectors. In order to assess the extent to which they
are able to compete with more traditional detection
approaches, we also implemented detectors that are
based on traditional NLP-based methods. We pro-
ceed by describing these two sets of models.
4.1 Deep-Learning Based Detectors
4.1.1 Input Preparation
Neural networks are optimized for classification tasks
where inputs are given as raw signals [24, 25]. Us-
ing these networks for text classification requires to
encode the text so that the network can process it.
Zhang et al. [46] explored treating text as a “raw
signal at character level” and applying to it a one-
dimensional CNN for text classification. We take
a similar approach for classifying PowerShell com-
mands as either malicious or benign.
First, we select which characters to encode. We
do this by counting for each character the number
of training set commands in which it appears and
then assigning a code only to characters that appear
in at least 1.4% of these commands. We have set
the encoding threshold to this value because at this
point there is a sharp decline in character frequency.
Thus, the least-frequent character encoded (which is
`) appeared in approx 1.4% of commands and the
most-frequent character that was not encoded (which
is a non-English character) appeared in only approx
0.3% of the training set commands.
Rare characters are not assigned a code in or-
der to reduce dimensionality and overfitting proba-
bility. The result is a set of 61 characters, contain-
ing the space symbol, all lower-case English letters
(we soon explain how we represent upper-case letters)
and the following symbols: -’!%&()*,./:;?@[\] `
{|}+<=>u^#$^~”
Similarly to [46], we use input feature length of
1,024, so if a command is longer than that it is
truncated. This reduces network dimensions and, as
shown by our evaluation in Section 5.2, suffices to
provide high-quality classification. The input to the
CNN network is then prepared by using “one-hot” en-
coding of command characters, that is, by converting
each character of the (possibly truncated) command
to a vector all of whose first 61 entries are 0 except
for the single entry corresponding to the character’s
code. All characters that were not assigned a code
are skipped.
In practice, we use 62-long vectors rather than 61-
long vectors in order to deal with the casing of En-
glish letters. Unlike in most NLP classification tasks,
in the context of PowerShell commands character cas-
ing may be a strong signal (see obfuscation method
1 in Figure 1). In order to retain casing information
in our encoding, we add a “case bit”, which is the
62’nd vector entry. The bit is set to 1 if the char-
acter is an upper-case English letter and is set to 0
otherwise. Thus, the representation of a PowerShell
command that is being input to the CNN network is
a 62x1,024 sparse matrix. A matrix representing a
command that is shorter than 1,024 is padded with
an appropriate number of zero columns.
As we described in Section 2.2, whereas CNNs are
traditionally used for computer vision and therefore
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typically receive as their input a matrix represent-
ing an image, recurrent neural networks (RNNs) are
optimized for processing sequences of data. Conse-
quently, the input we provide to our RNN classifier
is a vector of numbers of size at most 1,024, whose
i’th element is the code (as described above) of the
i’th command character (characters that were not as-
signed a code are skipped), except that we explicitly
encode upper-case English letters since we cannot use
a case bit for the RNN input representation.
4.1.2 Training
Stochastic gradient descent is the most widely-used
method for training deep learning models [47]. We
train our deep-learning based algorithms using mini-
batch gradient descent, in which each training epoch
(a complete pass over the training set) is sub-divided
to several mini-batches such that the gradient is com-
puted (and network coefficients are updated accord-
ingly) for each mini-batch.
In order to compare all our deep-learning networks
on the same basis, in all our experiments we used 16
training epochs and mini-batch size of 128. We also
experimented with other numbers of epochs/mini-
batches but none of them obtained significantly bet-
ter classification results.
4.1.3 Detection models
We implemented and evaluated 3 deep-learning based
detectors described in the following.
1. A 9-layer CNN (9-CNN). We use the network
architecture designed by [46], consisting of 6 con-
volutional layers with stride 1, followed by 2
fully connected layers and the output layer. Two
dropout layers are used between the 3 fully con-
nected layers and a max pooling layer follows the
first, second and last convolutional layers.7 Un-
like the architecture of [46] that uses fully con-
nected layers of size 1,024 or 2,048, we use 256
entries in each such layer as this provides better
performance on our data.
7Dropout and max pooling layers are typically not counted
towards the network’s depth.
2. A 4-layer CNN (4-CNN). We also implemented
a shallower version of the 9-CNN architecture
whose structure is depicted by Figure 2. It con-
tains a single convolutional layer with 128 ker-
nels of size 62x3 and stride 1, followed by a max
pooling layer of size 3 with no overlap. This
is followed by two fully-connected layers, both
of size 1,024 – each followed by a dropout layer
with probability of 0.5 (not shown in Figure 2),
and an output layer.
3. LSTM. We implemented a recurrent neural net-
work model composed of LSTM blocks and
used the character-level representation described
above. Since inputs are not sentences of a nat-
ural language, we decided not to use Word2Vec
[48] embedding. Instead, our LSTM architec-
ture contains an embedding layer of size 32. The
LSTM blocks we used are bi-directional LSTM
cells with output dimension of 256, followed by
two fully-connected layers, both of size 256, us-
ing a dropout probability of 0.5.
4.2 Traditional NLP-based detectors
We used two types of NLP feature extraction meth-
ods – a character level 3-gram and a bag of words
(BoW). In both we evaluated both tf and tf-idf and
then applied a logistic regression classifier on ex-
tracted features. The 3-gram model performed bet-
ter using tf-idf, whereas BoW performed better us-
ing tf. For each detector we selected the hyper-
parameters which gave the best cross-validation AUC
results (evaluation results are presented in Section 5).
Note that as the 4-CNN architecture uses a kernel
of length three in the first convolutional layer, the
features it uses are similar to those extracted when
using the character-level 3-gram detector.
4.3 Input Representation Considera-
tions
Recalling the obfuscation methods used by
PowerShell-base malware authors for avoiding
detection (see Section 2.1.1), we observe that our
input representation retains the information required
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for identifying them. The commands used for ob-
fuscation, including their short versions (obfuscation
method 2 in Figure 1), can be learnt due to the usage
of 3-sized kernels by the deep-learning models and
the usage of 3-grams by the traditional NLP models.
Obfuscation method 3 is addressed by the decoding
performed during data preparation (see Section 3.1).
Most other obfuscation methods (see Figure 1) use
special characters such as “`”, the pipe sign “|”,
the symbol “+” and the environment-variable sign
“$”. These special characters are often used when
strings and the values of environment variables are
concatenated in runtime for obfuscation. All these
special characters appear in a significant fraction of
our training set’s commands and consequently they
are all assigned codes by our input encoding for deep
networks. They are also retained in the input pro-
vided to the traditional NLP models.
As for the usage of random names (obfuscation
method 11), these typically include numbers (con-
verted to the ‘*’ sign) or alternating casing, and can
therefore be learnt by our classifiers as well. (As we
describe later, our deep learning classifiers do a better
job in learning such patterns.) The usage of special
strings such as ”[char]”, ”UTF8”, ”Base64” or the
character ’‘’ is also covered by both models as they
are retained in the input.
The only obfuscation method w.r.t. which the
input to some of our detectors is superior to
that provided to others is the usage of alternating
lower/upper case characters (obfuscation method 1
in Figure 1). Whereas the case-bit was easily incor-
porated in the input to our CNN deep-learning classi-
fiers, the RNN and the traditional NLP-based models
input representations do not accommodate its usage.
5 Evaluation
We performed 2-fold cross validation on the train-
ing data and present the area under the ROC curve
(AUC) results (rounded to the third decimal place)
of our detectors in Table 1. In addition to the 5 de-
tectors presented in Section 4, we also evaluated a
variant of 4-CNN (denoted 4-CNN*) in which we did
not use the case bit.
All detectors obtain very high AUC levels in the
range 0.985 − 0.990. The traditional NLP-based de-
tectors provide excellent results in the range 0.989−
0.990, the 4-CNN and LSTM detectors slightly lag
behind with AUC of 0.988 and 9-CNN provides a
lower AUC of 0.985. The 4-CNN* detector provides
slightly lower AUC than that of 4-CNN, establishing
that the case bit is beneficial.
For a detector to be practical, it must not produce
many false alarms. As the cyber security domain is
often characterized by a very high rate of events re-
quiring classification, even a low false-positive rate
(FPR) of (say) 1% may result in too many false
alarms. It is therefore important to evaluate the true
positive rate (TPR) (a.k.a. recall) provided by detec-
tors when their threshold is set for low FPR levels.
Table 2 presents the TPR of our detectors for
FPR levels 10−2, 10−3 and 10−4 on both the
training/cross-validation and the test sets. Since we
have a total of about 12,000 clean commands in the
test set, we stop the analysis at FPR level of 10−4.
Presented values in the “Cross-validation” part of the
table are the average of the two folds. Values in the
“Test set” part were obtained by models trained on
the training set in its entirety.
Focusing first on cross-validation results, it can be
seen that, while all classifiers achieve high TPR val-
ues even for very low FPR levels, the performance of
the traditional NLP detectors is better. The 3-gram
detector leads in all FPR levels with a gap that in-
creases when FPR values are decreased. Specifically,
even for an FPR of 1:10,000 it provides an excellent
TPR of 0.95. Among the deep-learning based detec-
tors, 4-CNN and LSTM are superior to 4-CNN* and
9-CNN. For FPR rate of 1:10,000, 4-CNN and LSTM
provide TPRs of 0.89 and 0.85, respectively. 9-CNN
obtains the worst results in all experiments.
Results on the test set are significantly lower but
still good. It is noteworthy that the gaps between the
traditional NLP and the 4-CNN/LSTM models that
we observed on the training data almost vanish on
the test data. This seems to indicate that the latter
models are able to generalize better.
For an FPR of 1:100, the best performers are 4-
CNN and 4-CNN* with a TPR of 0.89, LSTM is sec-
ond best with 0.88 and both the 3-gram and BoW
10
Table 1: Detectors’ area under the ROC curve (AUC) values.
9-CNN 4-CNN 4-CNN* LSTM 3-gram BoW
0.985 0.988 0.987 0.988 0.990 0.989
Table 2: TPR by FPR per model: cross-validation and test results.
FPR
Cross-validation Test set
10−2 10−3 10−4 10−2 10−3 10−4
9-CNN 0.95 0.89 0.73 0.72 0.52 0.24
4-CNN 0.98 0.96 0.89 0.89 0.76 0.65
4-CNN* 0.97 0.93 0.85 0.89 0.72 0.49
LSTM 0.98 0.95 0.85 0.88 0.81 0.64
3-gram 0.99 0.98 0.95 0.87 0.83 0.66
BoW 0.98 0.93 0.87 0.87 0.50 0.35
detectors obtain a TPR of 0.87. For FPR 1:1,000
the 3-gram detector is best with TPR of 0.83, only
slightly better than LSTM’s 0.81 TPR, and for FPR
1:10,000, all of 3-gram, 4-CNN and LSTM (ordered in
decreasing performance) identify approximately two
thirds of malicious commands. The significance of
the case bit is evident when comparing the results of
the 4-CNN and the 4-CNN* detectors on the test set
for FPR level of 1:10,000. The TPR when using the
case bit (4-CNN) is higher by almost one third than
that when it is not used (4-CNN*). 9-CNN is the
worst performer also in the test set experiments, by
a wider margin than in the cross-validation tests.
As we’ve mentioned, the performance on the test
set is significantly lower than that of cross-validation
in all experiments. This is to be expected: whereas
training set malicious commands were generated by
running malware inside a sandbox, the malicious
commands in the test set were contributed by security
experts. Consequently, test set malicious commands
may have been collected in different ways (e.g. by
searching the Windows registry for malicious Pow-
erShell commands) and may have been produced by
malware none of whose commands are in the training
set.
5.1 A Deep/Traditional Models En-
semble
We next show that by combining 4-CNN – our best
deep learning model and 3-gram – our best tradi-
tional NLP model, we are able to obtain detection
results that are better than those of each of them
separately. We then analyze the type of malicious
commands for which the deep model contributes to
the traditional NLP one.
The D/T Ensemble is constructed as follows. We
classify a command using both the 4-CNN and the
3-gram detectors, thus receiving two scores. If ei-
ther one of the scores is 0.99 or higher, we take the
maximum score, otherwise we take the average of the
two scores. We evaluated the Ensemble’s TPR by
FPR performance on the test set in the same man-
ner we evaluated the non-Ensemble algorithms (see
Table 2). The D/T Ensemble significantly outper-
formed all non-Ensemble algorithms and obtained on
the test set TPRs of 0.92, 0.89 and 0.72 for FPR
levels of 1:100, 1:1,000 and 1:10,000, respectively.
In order to gain better visibility into the contri-
bution of the 4-CNN detector on top of the 3-gram
detector, we present in Figures 3a-3c the confusion
matrixes of the 3-gram, 4-CNN and D/T Ensemble
detectors on the test set. These results are obtained
using the lowest threshold (for each of the algorithms)
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that provides an FPR of no more than 10−3. Since
the test set contains approximately 12,000 clean in-
stances, this means that the algorithms must have at
most 12 false positives.
As can be seen by comparing Figures 3a and 3c,
the D/T Ensemble adds 42 new detections on top of
those made by the 3-gram detector, with only 4 new
false positives. We analyzed these new detections in
order to understand where the deep learning model
is able to improve over the traditional NLP model.
Out of the new 42 detected commands, 15 com-
mands contain a sequence of alternating digits and
characters. In most cases, this sequence represented
the name of the host or domain from which the com-
mand downloaded (most probably malicious) con-
tent. Recall that in our pre-processing of commands,
we convert digits to asterisks (see Section 3.1), thus
the host/domain name contains many asterisks in it.
An example of the usage of such a name that ap-
peared in one of the newly detected commands is:
“..DownloadFile
(’http://d*c*a*ci*x*.<domain>’)..”.
Each of these names appears only once and they
are most probably generated by a domain genera-
tion algorithm (DGA) [49] used by the malware for
communicating with its command and control cen-
ter. Since these names are unique and seem random,
the 3-gram algorithm is unable to learn their pattern,
while the neural network is able to.
Figure 4a depicts an example of how such a host
name is encoded in the input to the neural network.
Note the pattern of alternating zeros and ones in the
row corresponding to the symbol ‘*’. Figure 4b de-
picts a neural network filter of size 3 that is able to
detect occurrences of this pattern. The filter con-
tains ones in the first and third columns of the row
corresponding to ‘*’ (where the ‘*’ symbol is expected
to be found) and a zero in the middle column of
that row, signifying that the character between the
two digits is of no significance. When this filter is
applied to the characters sequence depicted in Fig-
ure 4a, it creates a relatively strong signal. On the
other hand, considering the 3-gram’s feature extrac-
tion algorithm, since the character between the two
digits changes from one command to the other, the
model is unable to learn this pattern.
A similar argument can explain the detection of
a few additional commands by the D/T Ensemble
that were not detected by 3-gram. These commands
contain a random sequence of characters alternating
between lower and upper case, most probably gen-
erated by a DGA algorithm as well. Using the case
bit provided as part of its input, 4-CNN is able to
identify this pattern.
We note that in both the above cases, the
PoweShell commands may include additional indica-
tions of maliciousness such as the web client or the
cmdlets they use. Nevertheless, it is the ability to
detect patterns that incorporate random characters
and/or casing that causes 4-CNN to assign these com-
mand a score above the threshold, unlike the 3-gram
detector.
Our ensemble detector had only seven false
positive (FPs), which we manually inspected.
Two FPs exhibited obfuscation patterns – one
used [System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetString
(usage of UTF8 was observed in 1,114 of the clean
commands) and the other used the -EncodedCommand
flag (which was observed in 1,655 of the clean com-
mands). The remaining five FPs did not use any form
of obfuscation, but they all used at least two flags
such as -NoProfile and -NonInteractive (each
seen in 5,014 and 5,833 of the clean commands, re-
spectively).
5.2 Command Length Considerations
As previously mentioned, our detectors receive as in-
put a 1,024-long prefix of the PowerShell command
and longer commands are being truncated. As shown
by our evaluation, this suffices to provide high-quality
classification on our dataset.
A possible counter-measure that may be attempted
by future malware authors for evading our detection
approach is to construct long PowerShell commands
such that malicious operations only appear after a
long innocent-looking prefix consisting of harmless
operations. In the following, we explain how such
a hypothetic counter-measure can be thwarted.
Analyzing our dataset’s distribution of command
lengths, we find that the length of 86% of all ma-
licious commands and 88% of all clean commands
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Figure 4: A hostname encoding and a filter which was
used by the network to identify alternating digits and
letters
is 1,024 or less. Moreover, the length of 96.7% of
all malware commands and, more importantly, the
length of 99.6% of all clean commands is 2000 or
less. We remind the reader that all commands were
used by our detectors regardless of their length –
commands longer than 1,024 characters were simply
truncated. Given the good performance of all detec-
tors, we found no reason of using a longer input size.
It would be straightforward to modify our detectors
for accommodating inputs of size 2,048 or longer if
and when the characteristics of malicious commands
change such that this would be necessary. As of now,
clean commands whose length exceeds 2000 are very
rare, deeming them suspicious.
Figure 5 presents the command-length distribu-
tions of benign and malicious commands in our
dataset for commands of length 1,024 or less. The dis-
tribution of malicious command length is relatively
skewed to the right, indicating that malicious Power-
Shell commands tend to be longer than benign com-
mands. The high peak of very short malicious com-
mands is to due to Kovter trojan commands [17] that
constitute approximately 8% of the malicious com-
mands population in our dataset.
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Figure 5: PowerShell command-length distributions
of clean vs malicious commands.
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6 Related work
Zhang et al. [46] introduced a deep-learning approach
for text classification in which the input to convolu-
tional neural networks (CNNs) is at character-level
instead of word-level. They compared their deep-
learning based classifiers with word-based traditional
NLP methods (such as n-grams) and with recurrent
neural networks (using LSTM blocks). Their empir-
ical evaluation was conducted using sentiment anal-
ysis and topic classification datasets. Their results
show that, while traditional methods provided better
performance on small/medium datasets, character-
based CNNs outperformed them on larger datasets.
Our 9-CNN architecture is almost identical to theirs
and its inputs are encoded in a similar manner.
Prusa and Khoshgoftaar [50] compare several ar-
chitectures for short text sentiment analysis classi-
fication applied on a large dataset of tweets. They
show that two relatively shallow architectures (one
comprising 3 convolutional layers and 2 fully con-
nected layers and the other comprising a single convo-
lutional layer followed by a single LSTM layer) gave
the best results. Our results are aligned with theirs
in that also in our empirical evaluation the relatively
shallow 4-CNN network achieved better classification
performance than the deeper 9-CNN network. In
both settings, classified text is relatively short – up to
140 characters inputs in their study and up to 1,024
characters in ours.
Deep learning approaches are increasingly used in
recent years for malware detection. Some of these
works (see [51, 52, 53, 54] for a few examples) clas-
sify programs as either malicious or benign based on
their binary code and/or their runtime behaviour. In
order for the neural network to be able to classify
executable programs, a non-trivial feature extraction
pre-processing stage is typically required whose out-
put is fed to the neural network.
Athiwaratkun and Stokes [54] used a large dataset
consisting of Windows portable executable (PE) files.
They applied deep models to inputs representing the
system calls made by these programs. They imple-
mented and evaluated several models, including a
character-level CNN similar to the one used by [46].
Unlike our results, in their empirical evaluation the
LSTM model achieved the best results. However,
none of their neural networks was shallow.
Smith et al. also studied the problem of malware
detection based on system calls made by PE executa-
bles [55]. They used several classification algorithms,
including Random Forest, CNN and RNN. They ob-
served a decay in classification quality when input
length exceeded 1,000 system calls. Although prob-
lem setting and input domains differ, both our work
and theirs provide evidence that limiting input length
by some (domain specific) threshold may be sufficient
(and is sometimes even required) for obtaining good
performance.
Similarly to our work, Saxe and Berlin use deep
learning models for malware detection by analyzing
“cleartext” [56]. More specifically, they apply these
models on a large dataset consisting of (both benign
and malicious) URLs, file paths and registry keys.
Their CNN architecture uses a single convolutional
layer, as does our 4-CNN model.
Although some previous studies investigated the
problem of detecting malicious scripting-language
commands/scripts (where cleartext classification can
be applied), to the best of our knowledge none of
them addressed PowerShell. Several prior works pre-
sented detectors of malicious JavaScript commands
by employing feature extraction pre-processing fol-
lowed by the application of a shallow classifier (see,
e.g., [2, 3, 4]).
Wang et al. used deep models for classifying
JavaScript code collected from web pages [5]. Simi-
larly to our work, their model uses character-level en-
coding, with an 8-bit character representation. They
compare their classifiers with classic feature extrac-
tion based methods and study the impact of the num-
ber of hidden layers and their size on detection accu-
racy.
A few reports by AV vendors published in recent
years surveyed and highlighted the potential abuse of
PowerShell as a cyber attack vector [6, 16, 1]. Pon-
tiroli and Martinez analyze technical aspects of ma-
licious PowerShell code [16]. Using real-world exam-
ples, they demonstrate how PowerShell and .NET can
be used by different types of malware. Quoting from
their report: “Vast amounts of ready-to-use function-
ality make the combination of .NET and PowerShell
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a deadly tool in the hands of cybercriminals”.
A recent comprehensive technical report by
Symantec dedicated to PowerShell’s abuse by cyber-
crimials [1] reported on a sharp increase in the num-
ber of malicious PowerShell samples they received
and in the number of penetration tools and frame-
works that use PowerShell. They also describe the
many ways in which PowerShell commands can be
obfuscated.
Collectively, these reports shed light on the man-
ner in which PowerShell can be used in different
stages of a cyber attacks – from downloading ma-
licious content, through reconnaissance and malware
persistence, to lateral movement attempts. We have
used a few of the insights they provide on PowerShell
attacks for designing our detection models and for
preprocessing PowerShell commands.
As we’ve mentioned previously, Microsoft im-
proved the logging capabilities of PowerShell 5.0 in
Windows 10, with the introduction of the AntiMal-
ware Scan Interface (AMSI), but many methods of
bypassing it have already been published. This prob-
lem was discussed and addressed in [19], where the
fact that PowerShell is built on .NET architecture
was used for monitoring PowerShell’s activity, by
leveraging .NET capabilities. As discussed in their
work, the proposed solutions require some adjust-
ments which may hurt PowerShell’s performance, as
well as generate some artifacts on the machine.
7 Discussion
PowerShell commands can be executed from memory,
hence identifying malicious commands and blocking
them prior to their execution is, in general, imprac-
tical. We therefore estimate that the most plausi-
ble deployment scenario of our detector would be as
a post-breach tool. In such a deployment scenario,
PowerShell commands that execute will be recorded
and then classified by our detector. Commands clas-
sified as malicious would generate alerts that should
trigger further investigation. In corporate networks,
this type of alerts is typically sent to a security in-
formation and event management (SIEM) system and
presented on a dashboard monitored by the organiza-
tion’s CISO (chief information security officer) team.
There are several ways in which this work can be
extended. First, while we have implemented and
evaluated several deep-learning and traditional NLP
based classifiers, the design space of both types of
models is very large and a more comprehensive eval-
uation of additional techniques and architectures may
yield even better detection results.
Secondly, in this work we targeted the detection of
individual PowerShell commands that are executed
via the command-line. An interesting direction for
future work is to devise detectors for complete Power-
Shell scripts rather than individual commands. Such
scripts are typically longer than single commands and
their structure is richer, as they generally contain
multiple commands, functions and definitions. Ef-
fective detection of malicious scripts would probably
require significantly different input encoding and/or
detection models than those we used in this work.
Another interesting avenue for future work is to de-
vise detectors that leverage the information collected
by Microsoft’s AntiMalware Scan Interface (AMSI)
[18]. As mentioned previously, AMSI is able to record
PowerShell commands (generated both statically and
dynamically) that are executed in run-time, so de-
tectors may have more data to operate on. However,
although AMSI may be less vulnerable to many of
the obfuscation methods described in Section 2.1.1,
attackers may be able to find new ways of camouflag-
ing the AMSI traces of their malicious commands.
8 Conclusion
In this work we developed and evaluated two types
of ML-based detectors of malicious PowerShell com-
mands. Detectors based on deep learning architec-
tures such as Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs)
and Recurrent Neural Networks (RNNs), as well as
detectors based on more traditional NLP approaches
such as linear classification on top of character n-
grams and bag-of-words.
We evaluated our detectors using a large dataset
consisting of legitimate PowerShell commands exe-
cuted by users in Microsoft’s corporate network, ma-
licious commands executed on virtual machines de-
15
liberately infected by various types of malware, and
malicious commands contributed by Microsoft secu-
rity experts.
Our evaluation results show that our detectors
yield high performance. The best performance is pro-
vided by an ensemble detector that combines a tra-
ditional NLP-based classifier with a CNN-based clas-
sifier. Our analysis of malicious commands that are
able to evade the traditional NLP-based classifier but
are detected by the CNN classifier reveals that some
obfuscation patterns automatically detected by the
latter are intrinsically difficult to detect using tradi-
tional NLP-based classifiers. Our ensemble detector
provides high recall values while maintaining a very
low false positive rate and so holds the potential of
being useful in practice.
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